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Talk:Encryption: Difference between revisions
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>Morpheus m (→All closed-source software is backdoored!: Please sign next time) |
>Mrsnooze (thoughts on reworking the article) |
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== New Warning == | |||
So we have a new warning. How useful is it? | |||
; "Remember Just because it is widely considered safe doesn't mean exploits can not be found." | |||
: Technically true, but technically true of all software ever written. Therefore vague. Therefore not very useful. Can we write something more practical? | |||
: Table with current state of encryption breakage? Dates a must. | |||
: References to court cases where the encryptioin has clearly been tested by State actors? | |||
; "Also remember that encryption mechanisms aren't a cure-all to your problems. Only when used correctly can encryption work to your advantage." | |||
: This is very vague. What are "encryption mechanisms"? What are our "problems"? What specific technology in what situation is encryption "used correctly" and what "advantage" are we seeking? | |||
: Let's make this warning useful. Let's split it up into specific (i.e. exact commands/situations) for each section in the article. And if there isn't an appopriate section, create one. | |||
[[User:Mrsnooze|Mrsnooze]] ([[User talk:Mrsnooze|talk]]) 03:22, 20 February 2016 (EST) | |||
== Page Needs Rework == | |||
; Much of this article refers to Full Disk Encryption | |||
: It doesn't explicitly state so. An appropriate header of FDE should probably be added, with a warning that FDE is only useful when your computer is switched off/drive unmounted etc. A section on cold boot attacks wouldn't go astray. | |||
; Page should be split into sections. | |||
:FDE | |||
:phone encryption? | |||
:single file encryption | |||
:web encryption | |||
:communication encryption? | |||
:encryption standards | |||
:others? | |||
[[User:Mrsnooze|Mrsnooze]] ([[User talk:Mrsnooze|talk]]) 03:22, 20 February 2016 (EST) | |||
We should probably move all the disk encryption to its own page and use this as a overall page of encryption in general. -- [[User:God|God]] ([[User talk:God|talk]]) 02:20, 17 March 2015 (EDT) | We should probably move all the disk encryption to its own page and use this as a overall page of encryption in general. -- [[User:God|God]] ([[User talk:God|talk]]) 02:20, 17 March 2015 (EDT) | ||
Revision as of 08:22, 20 February 2016
New Warning
So we have a new warning. How useful is it?
- "Remember Just because it is widely considered safe doesn't mean exploits can not be found."
- Technically true, but technically true of all software ever written. Therefore vague. Therefore not very useful. Can we write something more practical?
- Table with current state of encryption breakage? Dates a must.
- References to court cases where the encryptioin has clearly been tested by State actors?
- "Also remember that encryption mechanisms aren't a cure-all to your problems. Only when used correctly can encryption work to your advantage."
- This is very vague. What are "encryption mechanisms"? What are our "problems"? What specific technology in what situation is encryption "used correctly" and what "advantage" are we seeking?
- Let's make this warning useful. Let's split it up into specific (i.e. exact commands/situations) for each section in the article. And if there isn't an appopriate section, create one.
Mrsnooze (talk) 03:22, 20 February 2016 (EST)
Page Needs Rework
- Much of this article refers to Full Disk Encryption
- It doesn't explicitly state so. An appropriate header of FDE should probably be added, with a warning that FDE is only useful when your computer is switched off/drive unmounted etc. A section on cold boot attacks wouldn't go astray.
- Page should be split into sections.
- FDE
- phone encryption?
- single file encryption
- web encryption
- communication encryption?
- encryption standards
- others?
Mrsnooze (talk) 03:22, 20 February 2016 (EST)
We should probably move all the disk encryption to its own page and use this as a overall page of encryption in general. -- God (talk) 02:20, 17 March 2015 (EDT)
All closed-source software is backdoored!
I removed some of the FUD regarding Microsoft and Mac OSX. The reported Bitlocker attack requires EM detection of TPM chips; it cannot be generalized to Bitlocker as a software system. To be honest, if the CIA needs to attack the TPM chip, this should be proof that there is actually no backdoor in Bitlocker... — Preceding unsigned comment added by Rfaelens (talk • contribs)